



Unconscious bias and the medical model: How the social model 




This is a copy of the accepted author manuscript of the following article: Bunbury, S. 
(2019) Unconscious bias and the medical model: How the social model may hold the key 
to transformative thinking about disability discrimination. International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law, 19 (1), pp. 26-47. doi:10.1177/1358229118820742 . The 
final definitive version is available from the publisher Sage at:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1358229118820742
© The Author(s) 2019
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
1Unconscious bias and the medical model: how the social 
model may hold the key to transformative thinking about 
disability discrimination.
Abstract
This article seeks to gain access to a new way to engage with disability discrimination and the 
legal approaches to it by focusing on the two central models: the medical and social models.  
It discusses how the law has based the definition of disability on the medical model, and 
suggests that this may strengthen some of the underlying factors that contribute to 
segregation and discrimination of disabled people. This article argues that the law should now 
switch focus to the social model, in an attempt to transform people’s attitudes towards 
disabled people and be a positive force to reduce discrimination.  It makes reference to the 
reasonable adjustment duty contained in s.20-21 Equality Act 2010, the Framework Directive 
and by way of comparison the American Disabilities Act 1990. Relevant critical theories are 
integrated as a means to explore the conception and the hierarchy that exists between able-
bodied individuals and disabled individuals. 
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Introduction
It has been estimated that about 15 per cent1 of individuals worldwide live with some form of 
disability of whom 2.2 per cent have difficulties with functioning (World Health 
Organization, 2011).2  Disability is unique within discrimination, in that every individual has 
the possibility of becoming disabled at any point in their lives and ‘disability’ covers such a 
range of characteristics.  With so many disabilities it makes it extremely difficult to address 
the inequalities that exist amongst disabled people.  There are two different theoretical 
models which attempt to define and combat disability discrimination: the social and medical 
models. These conceptual models are crucial to the understanding of disability 
discrimination, and the intention of legislative provisions aimed at combatting disability 
discrimination.  They provide a framework for interpreting the notions of disability (Cantor, 
2009). A range of critical approaches to social theories that attempt to address inequality have 
emerged over the years.  However, the critical awareness of and focus on one source of 
inequality, disability, has been less significant during this time, compared to other 
transformative areas such as feminism, queer theory and post colonialism (Goodley et al., 
2011). These theories will be explored in this article, to the extent that they may provide a 
new means by which to view disability related inequality, by examining different ways of 
thinking about disability discrimination and the theoretical models used to define disability.  
This article will explore the unique duty to make reasonable adjustments contained in anti-
discrimination legislation through the lens of the social and medical approaches to disability, 
by suggesting that a social model approach is a step in the right direction in order to eliminate 
disability discrimination, even though it may not be the panacea.
2  
The development of the law in the United Kingdom is predominantly based on disability 
theories that challenge disability discrimination with reference to mechanisms that label 
disability as a problem in need of a solution, rather than recognition of disability as different 
but equal (Goodley., et al 2011). This is in contrast to the more radical models associated 
with feminism, queer theory and critical race discourses, which attempt to disrupt ingrained 
patterns of thinking which instantiate discrimination.  Accordingly, a recognition of the 
narrowness of a medical framework of disability has been instrumental in America’s aim to 
renew the American with Disabilities Act 1990 (ADA 1990) and has also been the basis for 
the EU Framework Directive (Cantor, 2009).  It has been influential in shaping disability 
legislation in Australia in 1992 (Disability Discrimination Act 1992) and Great Britain in 
1995 (Disability Discrimination Act 1995) (Heyer, 1999).  In addition it has inspired 
movements worldwide, an example being the Canadian Human Rights Act which has made 
disability discrimination unlawful since 1985 (Heyer, 1999).  However the initial focus on the 
medical model of disability has led other instruments to follow this approach.  
This article will examine the different models and theories which attempt to explain 
inequality by focusing on how the law in the United States and UK interacts with the 
different theoretical models in transforming the experience of disabled people.  It argues that 
were Parliament to embrace the social model it may increase the pace of the approaches to 
disability and reduce the levels of discrimination that disabled people face in the UK.
Defining Disability
Although the current influence of the moral model of disability is negligible, it is historically 
the oldest of all such models and views disability as a direct consequence of sin or fault 
(McTigue, 2010).   It also suggests that, disability is divinely inflicted and arises due to some 
inadequacy of the individual (McTigue, 2010).   While few would have any support for this 
model, its historical legacy adds insight to the pervasive negativity associated with disability 
which contributes to discriminatory discourse; the model still illustrates the stigma attached 
to being disabled (McTigue, 2010).  Whilst the law attempts to remedy issues of inequality 
amongst disabled individuals, it has been suggested that in some cases the law perpetuates 
attitudes inadvertently that reinforce rather than combat discrimination, through use of the 
individual or medical model, as opposed to the social model.  The UK definition is now 
contained in the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010) and disability is listed as a protected 
characteristic.3  Disability under the EqA 2010 is defined as a physical or mental impairment 
which has a long-term effect on normal day to day activities.4 Impairment is defined as a 
biomedical property, which has been extended to include non-physical, sensory and 
intellectual forms of impairment.      
Medical model
Previous research has identified that disabled individuals in the past have been associated 
with negative stereotypes which inevitably suggests that disabled individuals are pitiable and 
pathetic (Payne, 2006).  Moreover, the medical model assumes that the disabled person’s 
autonomy is limited due to the impairment, therefore if medical professionals cannot cure or 
rehabilitate the person, then she or he is considered as someone who as a consequence, has a 
limited ability to participate in society. Hence a person’s disability may in some 
circumstances hinder participation, which in turn leads to social exclusion.  Medical 
professionals or specialists have been tasked with the job of rectifying or curing the 
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Corby, 2003). Unsurprisingly, this model has created controversy amongst disabled people, 
and has been challenged by disabled individuals themselves.  This medicalisation role often 
reinforces the disabled person’s dependency and sick role (Finkelestien, 1998). It has been 
replicated in disability legislation which does not assist in transforming attitudes but instead 
perpetuates the issue.  
In addition, the internalisation of capitalism means that disabled people are valued less (sub-
consciously), as they are not as economically productive or do not appear to be; this 
marginalisation of a disabled individual has contributed to the oppression disabled 
individuals encounter (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2013).  Oliver has indicated that the idea of 
normality developed within the rise of capitalism, which focused on the need for a workforce 
to be usefully trained and productive (Terzi, 2004).  This view does not assist disabled people 
since they are not given the opportunity to climb the capitalist ladder, if a disabled individual 
cannot contribute to ‘the production of material goods’ by providing their labour, they have 
no use in society. And this creates not just financial but social inequality.  Marx suggests that 
‘those individuals who could not be included in the category of ability identified in terms of 
productivity became identified as dis-abled people’ (Terzi, 2004: 144).  This view implies 
that disability is a personal deficit in need of medical intervention (Terzi, 2004).  In short, this 
view suggests that disabled people themselves are the source of the problem which over the 
years has had negative connotations.  It must be noted that this view is not universally 
accepted, since many believe that it is not the physical, cognitive, sensory and emotional 
make-up of the individual that is the problem, but the social institutions and human made 
environments that were created without considering the differing characteristics of all people 
(Asch, 2001).  If the impairment is a major contributing factor to inequality, participation in 
society for a disabled individual is likely to be difficult at best, impossible at worst.  
Commentators and disability activists have used the social model to challenge the medical 
model in an attempt to transform attitudes amongst disabled people, and argue that it is the 
solution to the issues disabled individuals encounter.  It is to this model I now turn.
Social model
Unsurprisingly the social model has been developed due to the inadequacy of the medical 
model of disability (Lang, 2001) and in particular has attempted to change ingrained 
attitudes, whereas the medical model has struggled to do this through the use of the law. 
Interestingly the social model movement has been influenced by disabled groups in the 1960s 
and 70s due to the civil rights movement in America.5 It advocates for the removal of social 
barriers in an attempt to promote inclusion and social change leading to the transformation of 
society (Shakespeare and Watson, 2002).  Instead of focusing on the impairment itself, the 
social model focuses on society being the cause of the problems which disable the individual, 
therefore illustrating a shift from ‘means of production.’  In the last decade the social model 
has had a significant impact in shaping public policy and education in the US (Anastasiou 
and Kauffman, 2013), and has led to re-defining disability in terms of the social environment 
(Bailey et al., 2015). The model ignores the functional, physiological and cognitive elements, 
but rather focuses on the wider external environment, suggesting that disability is socially 
constructed (Lang, 2001); it does so in an attempt to change ingrained attitudes that exist in 
disability discourse.  Although some progress has been made by disability activists to tackle 
this problem, disabled people continue to be subjected to oppression (Kelly, 2011).   
As a consequence, research focusing on care and disability has grown, and is a key player in 
shaping policies in the UK and other countries (Kröger, 2009).  Care has been interpreted to 
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disabled people renders the disabled individual powerless (Morris, 1997:54). Kröger (2009) 
adds that the concept of care views disabled people as passive who struggle to manage their 
life.  It has been noted that ‘…disability is seen as something imposed on disabled people on 
top of their impairment by an oppressive and discriminating social and institutional structure’ 
(Terzi, 2004: 143). Thus, the cause of disablement can be linked to the oppression of the 
social and economic structure on disabled individuals (Terzi, 2004).  Therefore the care or 
treatment designed to correct or amend the body should not only focus on this issue, but 
instead emphasis should be placed on breaking down societal barriers to overcome the 
disadvantage, faced by the disabled population.6  Unsurprisingly, supporters of the social 
model argue that ‘care’ is a complex form of oppression and reject it as a term and concept 
(Kelly, 2011).  It is in effect a critique of medical institution and social policy (Kelly, 2011).  
Advocates of the social model suggest that the law should be used as a mechanism to change 
embedded attitudes and unconscious biases by focusing on the social barriers disabled 
individuals face.  This is in turn assists in challenging complex ingrained attitudes and 
perceptions that exist which in some circumstances improve the care disabled individuals 
receive (Goering, 2010). 
   
Indeed, differing theories that attempt to explain social inequality and social exclusion by 
unpacking the assumptions disabled individuals encounter.  However defining disability is far 
from straightforward, the distinction between impairment and disability is crucial to 
understanding the social model, and its impact it has had on current legislation.
The social model:  the distinction between impairment and disability
Importantly, in order to understand the social model fully in relation social exclusion it is 
crucial distinction between ‘impairment’ and ‘disability’.  Impairment is attributed to 
functional limitation characterised by a physical or mental impairment, whereas disability is 
linked to the loss of opportunities in society caused by society’s failure to break down the 
barriers (physical and social) which hinder participation and equality within the community 
(Barnes, 1991).7  Additionally, it has been noted, that important contributing factors to the 
problem of disability discrimination are the issues of impairment and disability, and the 
relationship with the concept ‘normal people’.  As discussed previously, the concept of caring 
can be closely linked to the issue of segregation, and the need to keep the disabled person or 
the person with a disease segregated from normal participation (Imrie, 1996).  Studies have 
shown that ‘normal people’ struggle to accept disabled individuals fully.  On the other hand, 
disabled individuals find it extremely difficult to accept help, since it is linked to low self-
esteem because of a self-fulfilling labelling process (Imrie, 1996).  Consequently, there is a 
need for not only able bodied people to change attitudes, but also those that make public 
policy (Wedderburn, 1974).  
In order to understand inequality amongst disabled individuals, it is helpful to consider the 
interaction between illness and disability (Oliver, 2009).  Thus, impairment is defined as a 
biomedical property which has been extended to include non-physical, sensory and 
intellectual forms of impairment.  Disability on the other hand imposes restrictions and 
disablement has nothing to do with the body.  Physical disability is seen as a form of social 
oppression which the social model aims to eliminate by trying to ‘denounce and remove the 
disabling barriers produced by hegemonic social and cultural institutions’ (Terzi, 2004: 143).  
Disability is therefore regarded as a social creation which causes the impairment to be a 
problem (Shakespeare, 2006).  As such, the concept of disability is socially constructed, and 
based upon a dominant able bodied hegemonic model, which can be compared to the 
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societies globally and is reflected in disability discourse (Connell, 1993).  Oliver has 
suggested that the medicalisation of the social model has not assisted disabled individuals, 
since these individuals are given low priority8 when competing against other disadvantaged 
groups (Oliver, 2009). These issues are not confined to physical or mental impairments, but 
also to the economic structures which exclude disabled people from participation in 
mainstream activities (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2013) that result in exclusion from social 
and recreational activities.  
Furthermore, the media has contributed to the social construction of disability by portraying 
men and women as different in terms of the dominant ideology, which in turn reinforces the 
socially constructed view of women, which is organised, financed and supervised by men 
(Connell, 1993).  A similar parallel can be drawn with disability, since the dominant group 
(able-bodied) control how disability is understood, as well as how disabled individuals are 
viewed, and portrayed by society. These stereotypes operate within the area of disability 
discourse, and serve as an aid in understanding the stereotyping practices which arise in 
disability discrimination.  Interestingly, the parallel drawn between impairment and disability 
is a convenient mental construct for advocates of the medical model, and is an abstract that 
ignores the social construct, biological and psychological issues and are often complex and 
difficult to tackle in disability discourse (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2013).  Disabled scholars 
argue that breaking the causal link with impairment is an important factor in order to 
eradicate or find a solution to the oppression disabled individuals encounter (Terzi, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned matter, the social model has played an important role in 
understanding disability, in relation to inclusion (Terzi, 2004).  Likewise, those with a 
disability require extra support depending on the illness or disability.  Society is willing to 
accept some limitations but not all of them, the limitations which society cannot meet are 
labelled as a disability (Herring, 2013) which does not assist in challenging attitudes towards 
disability amongst society.  
The complex relationship between the impairment and the social and physical environment 
challenges the medical model in that it places emphasis on society and the environment, 
rather than focusing on the individual’s impairment (Woodhams and Corby, 2003). 
Ultimately this challenges our understanding of disability from a medical law perspective 
since the focus shifts from impairment, to the social exclusion of a disabled person, and the 
way society deals with or responds to this (Oliver, 2009).  Moreover, this hinders 
participation amongst disabled people.  Although this may be the case, this view is 
challenged in relation to the disabling barriers experienced by people with cognitive 
impairments9 and those that have impairments that are socially disabling (Shakespeare, 
2006).  In short, not all impairments are caused by the social arrangements, and therefore 
impairment is a social judgement, whereas disability focuses on the effects of the impairment 
(Shakespeare, 2006).  
Although theories attempt to explain the issues that arise with social inequality, they fail to 
address the underlying issue of the way society has been and is still set up, which is mainly 
dominated by able-bodied men who wrote the law.  These theories also fail to challenge 
ingrained attitudes and perceptions, which makes it difficult to address, as the law is currently 
based on the medical model (the individual’s impairment).  It is therefore not surprising that 
an individual with a disability would not be an issue in terms of social inclusion.  
Interestingly the law has attempted to combat some of these issues, however it has not tackled 
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transform societal attitudes that exist.
Explaining social inequality
Is the inequality associated with disability discourse, necessarily a bad thing?  It has been 
suggested that inequality in society is necessary in order for society to function.  Although 
this is the case, society focuses on work as the core of life because we focus on a monetary 
value, and an earned money approach which does not serve the disabled person well.  
Functionalist theorists believe that certain positions in society are more functionally 
important than others, and not everyone in society is the same or has the talent or skills to fill 
these positions (Oliver, 1998).   Functionalism stresses that stratification is needed; this 
benefits society because the best people are required for particular roles in society.10 But 
although stratification leads to distinctions between drawn between groups, it does not 
necessarily have to lead to inequality. It is the value placed on those distinctions that result in 
either “different but equal” or “different but unequal”. And it is that distinction that is at the 
heart of the two models in question here. For example, the “different but equal” approach can 
be illustrated with reference to a football match, most football players play to their strengths, 
with the aim of winning as a team.11 The team values difference and knows that by building 
on the strengths of each player the team may be successful.  If society adopted the same view, 
a broadly team-based or collectivist approach, then disabled individuals could play to their 
strengths; this would potentially breakdown barriers to exclusion. And yet an individualistic, 
capitalist approach has led to value judgements about worth being made, and thus 
stratification has led to inequality. Society’s approach may be functionalist (what functions 
can each individual perform) but it has been influential in understanding the difficulties 
disabled individuals encounter, it places emphasis on medicine’s role to cure and maintain the 
normal functioning of individuals and of society.  In this model, the ‘sick role’ is viewed as 
predominant in disabled individuals’ identities and functionality and involves being 
compliant and wanting to get well in an attempt to integrate disabled individuals into society, 
and address the issues of social exclusion (Oliver, 1998).  
Unsurprisingly, this view does not address societal attitudes and prejudice that arise because 
of an individual’s disability.  This identifies the link between disability and social deviance 
that functionalists make which in turn influences the health care system and supports the 
dominance of health care support for disabled individuals (Oliver, 1998).  This is not without 
precedent, and there is some evidence to suggest that sex inequality has resulted from similar 
value judgements being placed on women’s roles, which are universally less valued than 
men’s roles (Webley, 2011).  Critics of this hypothesis argue that historically the lesser value 
placed on women’s work stem from biological factors, and that any stratification of roles and 
values that flow from this are as a result of the best socially constructed division of labour 
given inherent biological differences between men and women (Webley, 2011).  Similarly, 
functionalists who argue for stratification in these circumstances would argue that in order for 
society to operate, it is necessary for the dominant group, to have this clear division of power 
and roles such that all may flourish. Their feminist critics, in contrast, suggest that 
functionalism is largely about the maintenance of a hierarchy, which serves a particular group 
(the dominant, the patriarchy) well (Webley, 2011).  There are useful parallels here in the 
context of disability inequality, whether based on biological, functional or social construction 
distinctions. And gender and disability intersect too:  evidence suggests that disabled women 
face higher levels of social disadvantage than disabled men (Payne, 2006). Unfortunately, 
functionalism does not serve women or the disabled well; it has been asserted that 
functionalism in some respects confuses impairment and disability with sickness and fragility 
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this by failing to address the underlying cultural and economic issues that cause disability 
related inequality (Oliver, 1998), and the law reinforces the functionalist approach.
But it is not only feminist theory that allows us new ways of conceiving of disability 
inequality; exploration of critical race theory also provides similar opportunities. Critical race 
theory is founded on the understanding that ‘racism is not aberrant but rather the natural order 
of American life.’ (Asch, 2001: 405).  We can draw comparisons between this and the 
suggestion that disability discrimination is a natural occurrence in life.    Critical race 
theorists contend that in order to understand inequality, one should look at society including 
the public and courts.  Critical race theory posits that there are subtle forms of bias that are 
cumulative and lead to stratification on grounds of race, with different ethnic groups being 
assigned differential value by dominant or hierarchically superior groups based on this social 
stratification; some groups (dominant group) end up with a better system than other groups. It 
has been suggested that ‘racism is an ingrained feature of our landscape; it looks ordinary and 
natural to persons in the culture’ (Asch, 2001: 393). A similar parallel can be drawn with 
disability, in that disability can be seen as a natural occurrence, with concomitant 
stratification and value differentiation asserted by those with power over those who do not.  
The legislative framework is drawn up by dominant groups, who view the world through 
their own lens, and the courts in turn apply the framework in-keeping with the legislature’s 
will.  Society organises itself around the legal framework and a self-reinforcing cycle of 
unconscious biases serves some groups more favourably than others. The law has attempted 
to address this inequality amongst disabled individuals, however in some cases it has 
contributed to the oppression disabled individuals encounter. These models have caused 
contention in defining disability, and have been instrumental in shaping law and policy in the 
UK.  In some cases it has attempted to transform attitudes through the introduction of 
disability legislation designed to combat anti-discrimination legislation.   
Challenges:  The Law 
Unsurprisingly the main driver for disability equality legislation in the UK has been the 
impact of disablement after both World Wars (World War One and World War Two), and the 
social obligation to address discriminatory practices against disabled people (Barnes and 
Mercer, 2004).  In the UK, a high number of the population were injured, and many 
combatants were left disabled.    Furthermore, The Disability Persons (Employment) Act 1944 
had a positive impact on the employment of disabled people which primarily focussed on the 
issues disabled individuals encounter generally and enhanced their employment opportunities 
(Barnes and Mercer, 2004).  This prompted a change in legislation, and as a result changed 
attitudes towards employing disabled people.12  Additionally, the 1980s experienced 
organisations campaigning for disabled people which ultimately led to the enactment of the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (“DDA 1995”) (Barnes and Mercer, 2004) which was 
later amended by the Disability Discrimination Act 2005.  
    
The EqA 2010 mirrors the provisions contained in the DDA 1995,13 and has now replaced the 
DDA 1995.  The provisions are similar to its predecessor, therefore, existing case law decided 
under the DDA 1995 is still relevant to this discussion and remains good law.14  Disability is 
defined as a physical or mental impairment that has a long-term adverse effect on an 
individual’s ability to carry out their normal day to day activities. 15  Although this definition 
may seem simplistic, the ‘gauging’ of applicants against the definition of disability has been 
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disability has caused controversy for the judiciary in determining whether an individual 
qualifies as a disabled person, and in many cases has deterred claimants from pursuing their 
claims (Wells, 2003).  Due to its restrictive nature and complexity, tribunals and courts have 
spent a considerable amount of time in trying to establish whether an applicant satisfies the 
criteria under the Act.  Case law rulings have been used as a mechanism to interpret the 
convoluted definition and the duty to make reasonable adjustments.16  It is apparent that 
judicial interpretation and restrictive statutory language have prevented the definition from 
being interpreted purposively (Lawson, 2008).   
Impairment is central to the medical model, and it has been noted that the focus on 
impairment is on medical diagnosis rather than societal barriers (Hepple, 2011).  The EqA 
2010 itself portrays disabled people as less economically productive, due to a disabled 
person’s impairment.  Some of the arguments adopted by the medical model ‘endorse policies 
that at best are likely to be ineffective in promoting social participation and at worst reinforce 
disadvantage and social exclusion’ (Payne, 2006: 253).  
In considering whether an individual has an impairment ‘the investigation is to be on the 
effect that it has on an individual, rather than on the underlying cause.’ (Butler, 2014 p.3). 
Butler (2014) notes that this involves practical considerations that appear to fall outside the 
scope of the definition (Butler, 2014 p.3).  Unsurprisingly ‘each impaired individual is 
distinct and different and will combine these variables in different strengths.’  (Woodhams 
and Corby, 2003).  In Walker v Sita Information Networking computer Ltd 17 Langstaff P 
ruled ‘…an impairment may be caused as a consequence of a condition which is itself 
excluded from the scope of the definition of disability’.  Interestingly, in establishing whether 
obesity is a disability in Karsten Kaltoft v The Municipality of Billund18the A-G made 
reference to the medical identification of obesity focusing on the individuals Body Mass 
Index (BMI) and concluded that individuals that were in Class III (BMI) would potentially be 
covered under the definition of disability; as they would most probably experience difficulties 
or limitations with mobility, endurance and mood (Ferris and Marson, 2014). This 
medicalised approach demonstrates the hurdles individuals have to overcome in order to 
satisfy the impairment criteria contained in the EqA 2010. It has been suggested that obesity 
impacts on an individual’s mental wellbeing and because of this, must be a consideration in 
establishing whether the condition is an impairment. (Butler, 2014).19  In addition, previous 
legislation required the mental condition to be ‘clinically well-recognised’. (Wells, 2003).20  
Unfortunately, tribunals and courts are still struggling to identify mental or physical 
impairments which in the majority of cases not only involve a physical impairment but also 
the possibility of a concurrent mental impairment (Butler, 2014).  In determining whether an 
individual is disabled for the purposes of the Act medical evidence of disability is required 
and is a crucial factor in establishing disability as ‘…the definition relies on measurement, 
assessment and medical testament of the lack of functional activities as they relate directly to 
the impairment.’ (Woodhams and Corby, 2003p.164).  Medical evidence has proven to be 
problematic in establishing whether an applicant has an impairment and in many cases is 
costly and stressful for many potential applicants. (Woodhams and Corby, 2003p.164).  
Medical proof itself may not be determinative, as in some cases Employment Tribunals, not 
doctors, have to decide whether the applicant falls within [the meaning of disability] by 
considering medical evidence available in order to establish an impairment (Woodhams and 
Corby, 2003).  Inevitably, this assessment involves a number of complex conditions which 
tribunals and courts do not have the apt level of expertise in reaching a decision based on 
medical evidence (Wells, 2003); and as a consequence restricts a number of individuals being 
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evidence has in many cases perpetuated the labelling and stigma experienced by disabled 
individuals in trying to participate in the labour market. (Wells, 2003).  These complexities in 
providing medical evidence have reinforced the medicalised definition which is at odds with 
the social model and in many cases has not assisted in transforming attitudes towards 
disability.  
Not only does an individual have to provide evidence of an impairment, the individual then 
has to demonstrate how the impairment has an effect on their day to day activities. It is clear 
that the definition contained in the EqA 2010 reinforces the medical model by imposing the 
requirement that impairments must be linked to day to day activities (such as making, beds 
ironing and various minor DIY tasks),22without taking into account any social or physical 
environmental factors. (Woodhams and Corby, 2003).  Ignoring these environmental factors 
exacerbate ‘disableness’ and as a result generalises most people’s day to day activities 
(Woodhams and Corby, 2003).  This assessment takes into account the ability to carry out 
day to day activities and includes general forms of mobility, as well as the ability to perform 
tasks of work (Ferris and Marson, 2014).  Previous legislation provided a list of ‘normal day 
to day’ activities.  However, the list has now been removed in an attempt to make it easier for 
disabled applicants to satisfy the definition and as a result has extended the interpretation of 
an impairment.  A list of examples are now contained in the Guidance which is in fact 
remarkably similar to the list contained in the DDA 1995 and includes a non-exhaustive list 
of examples (Butler, 2014).  The examples contained in the Guidance can be considered as a 
social approach to defining disability (Butler, 2014) in an attempt to transform attitudes and 
breakdown societal barriers.     In order to establish a normal day to day activity for the 
purposes of the definition the activity should focus on whether the activity is carried out by a 
large amount of people on a regular basis (Butler, 2014).  This restrictive approach has been 
demonstrated in Goodwin v Patent Ofiice23 where it was suggested that just because an 
individual can carry out normal day to day activities it does not mean that their ability to do 
so has not been impaired.  Mr Justice Morrison stated:
What is a day-to-day activity is left unspecified: easily recognised, but defined with 
difficulty.  What can be said is that the inquiry is not focused on a particular set of 
circumstances.  Thus, it is not directed to the person’s own particular circumstances, 
either at work or home. The fact that a person cannot demonstrate a particular skill, 
such as playing the piano, is not an issue before the tribunal, even if it is considering 
a claim by a musician.  Equally, the fact that a person had arranged their home to 
accommodate their disability would make inquiries as to how they managed at their 
particular home not determinative of the issue. 
Although the decision in Goodwin is crucial in determining whether an individual is disabled, 
it fails to make a distinction between tasks performed at home or in work in assessing a 
normal day to day activity (Butler, 2014).  In establishing whether the impairment has a 
substantial24  and long-term adverse effect ‘…the first instance tribunal is stopped from 
holding that, because the disabled applicant can do most things, there is no substantial 
effect…’ (Jefferson, 2014).25  
It is clear that these decisions in the courts and tribunal demonstrate how restrictive nature of 
the definition is in practice.  The definition places emphasis on ‘normal day to day’ activities, 
which is determined on a case by case basis creating barriers to potential applicants.  This in 
turn reinforces the medicalised approach adopted in the EqA 2010 for defining disability.  
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As discussed earlier this model has been criticised for concentrating on the medicalisation of 
disability, which inevitably suggests that disabled people have something wrong with them, 
and also extends to associative discrimination based on disability.26  These negative 
connotations contained in the definition do not assist a disabled person, which inevitably 
restricts the law in transforming attitudes.  It is apparent that if a disabled individual is to be 
classified as disabled, the physical or mental impairment must be the factor taken into 
account in establishing whether the impairment itself has a substantial27 and long-term 
effect28 on their ability to carry out normal day to day activities.29  Although most illnesses 
are treatable and can even be cured, most impairments are not curable, ‘disability can 
[therefore] be eradicated by changes to the way we organise society’ (Oliver, 2009: 44). 
Oliver believes that the only way to combat this is by trying to remove the barriers that 
disable an individual, rather than spending too much time and investment on individually 
based interventions (Oliver, 2009).  This would inevitably involve challenging ingrained 
attitudes and perception about disability.  A barrier free environment will not just benefit the 
disabled individual, but also benefit society as a whole (Oliver, 2009).30
Moreover, the labelling of an individual as ‘disabled’ has been a contributing factor in 
relation to the stigma associated with disability, and as a consequence many disabled 
individuals reject the label.  By way of illustration, people that have been diagnosed with 
cancer, HIV infection or multiple sclerosis in the UK are automatically protected and are 
regarded as disabled.31  Additionally, research suggests that the reason for the automatic 
classification once diagnosed appears to be the association of HIV/AIDS with ‘…behaviours 
that may be considered socially unacceptable by many people’ (McTigue, 2010: 1).  This 
demonstrates the importance the law places on the stigma related to the disease, and not the 
impairment (McTigue, 2010: 1-9).  Thus, Parliament’s decision to classify HIV as a 
“disability” under the DDA 200532 protects those individuals living with the disease.  Instead 
of challenging ingrained attitudes and perception, British legislation in some respects pities 
the disabled individual and reinforces discrimination by using the term impairment, whilst 
attempting to solve the issues by making reasonable adjustments for disabled individuals.33 
Lawson (2008) indicates that: ‘the notion of ‘reasonableness’ is objective in nature’ and is 
judged by reference to objectively demonstrable facts and circumstances (Lawson 2008).   
Although the duty to make reasonable adjustments can be interpreted widely there are limits.  
In Monmouthsire County Council v Harris 34 there was no finding of a continuing obligation 
to make reasonable adjustments as the medical evidence provided did not make any 
recommendations that could be implemented made to ensure the Claimant could return to 
work.35
The rulings in these cases to date and the nature of this unique duty have added to the 
complexity in establishing ‘reasonableness’.  In addition to establishing whether the applicant 
satisfies the criteria,36 the duty to make reasonable adjustments is much dependent on the 
sector.37 (Lawson, 2008).  The duty is only triggered in an employee and employer 
relationship when the ‘disabled person concerned’ is substantially disadvantaged because of 
the employer’s behaviour, up until this point the duty is reactive (Lawson, 2008).  This has 
been demonstrated in Archibald v Fife38 where the House of Lords overturned the lower 
courts’ decision and ruled that the term ‘arrangements’ included situations where an 
individual could not perform their job due to a disability.39  (Lawson, 2008).  In comparison, 
the service provider’s duty is proactive in that service providers are required to take a 
proactive approach in accommodating customers, and other individuals by anticipating 
barriers individuals are likely to encounter, and where reasonable, attempt to remove them 
(Lawson, 2008).  Service providers have struggled in adhering to this proactive duty and have 
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fallen foul of the anticipatory duty to make reasonable adjustments for disabled service 
users.40  Not only are disabled individuals protected by anti-discrimination legislation; the 
law now extends to those individuals associated with disabled individuals (although they 
themselves may not have a disability) in an attempt to transform attitudes and breakdown the 
barriers that hinder participation in daily life.  
Association and disability
The law now extends protection to those individuals that are associated with a person who 
has a disability.  In so far as disability is concerned, discrimination by association41 highlights 
that it is not only the social barriers or physical barriers that hinder participation, but also the 
attitudes of people, which are socially constructed (Burke, 2010).  This issue was addressed 
in the case of Coleman v Attridge Law,1 where it was ruled that the employer unlawfully 
discriminated against the employee because her son was disabled, this amounted to 
discrimination by association.   Research has indicated that family members perceive 
themselves as disabled if they have a family member that is disabled. In other words, if they 
are associated with a disabled individual they can be subject to disability discrimination 
(Burke, 2010).  
Until recently, the UK predecessor (DDA 1995) of the EqA 2010 was limited by not having 
provisions that protect individuals associated with a disabled person; however it is clear that 
the ADA 1990 defines disability broadly.  The renewal of the ADA 1990 has changed the way 
judges define disability in America, by focusing on a social model which has been instilled 
into the Act (Cantor, 2009).  The definition of impairment under the ADA 1990 has not been 
limited to physical impairment.  It has been acknowledged that an impairment can manifest 
from society’s misconceived attitudes (Wenbourne, 2000).  Following Coleman,2 the EQA 
20103 now allows individuals associated with a disabled person to be afforded protection by 
introducing ‘discrimination by association’.  The Act now extends protection to those 
individuals that are associated with a person who has a disability and applies to all forms of 
protected characteristics (Jefferson, 2014). It has been highlighted that the decision in 
Coleman is reflective of the social model in that it focuses on external factors such as 
negative attitudes which disables individuals (De Paor, 2017). This serves as evidence to 
suggest that the law in the UK is moving towards a social model approach, in an attempt to 
eliminate discrimination amongst disabled individuals, and those associated with the disabled 
person.  Interestingly, an individual may be subject to disability discrimination because of 
their association with a disabled person; it constructs a perception of disability, when in fact 
no perceptible disability may exist (Burke, 2010).  
The solution: the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 and the impact on 
Europe
The narrowness of the medical model was addressed in the United States in the 1990s, and 
has shaped disability civil rights in the UK and Europe (Wenbourne, 2000).  The acceptance 
of the social model being a dominant model in Europe was fundamental in America’s attempt 
to renew the ADA 1990 (Cantor, 2009).  Thus, the legislative framework serves as a 
fundamental tool in the longstanding debate in defining disability, and the use of both 
models.  Unsurprisingly, the social model has been regarded as a benchmark for the EU and 
1
 Coleman v Attridge Law Case C-303/06 [2008] IRLR 722.
2
 Coleman v Attridge Law Case C-303/06 [2008] IRLR 722.
3
 S.13 EQA 2010 defines discrimination by association.
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abroad (Cantor, 2009). This was adopted in Europe which was based on the European 
Community Treaty Article 13 (Cantor, 2009).  Consequently, the ADA 1990 has been crucial 
in defining disability and understanding the appropriateness in using the social and medical 
model to define disability in both the US and UK (Cantor, 2009).  It is apparent that the 
medical model has created various problems for disabled citizens in Europe, since it is 
narrow and therefore cannot ‘realize the progressive remedial purpose behind the Framework 
Directive’s disability provisions’ (Cantor, 2009: 401).  Although the DDA 1995 (EqA 2010 
predecessor) has been the most radical legislation in Europe in so far as disability 
discrimination is concerned, it has no doubt had flaws (Wenbourne, 2000), and is unpopular 
since it has not transformed views and cannot, or is not prepared to change attitudes, 
compared to other types of legislation.42  
Commentators have highlighted that the renewal of the ADA 1990 was well received during 
the 1990s in the US, and more recently in Europe; which has been an inspiration for the 
Framework Directive on Employment (Cantor, 2009). Moreover, the renewal of the ADA 
1990 attempted to alter the legislative interpretation of disability which included removing 
sections in the ADA 1990, and as a result there was less judicial reliance on a medical model, 
but rather the focus was on defining disability (Cantor, 2009).  The definition contained in the 
ADA 199043 differs a little from the EQA 2010 in that the ADA 1990 adopts a social model 
approach in an attempt to transforms attitudes. Although the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) is not part of our domestic law it has been 
influential at both EU and national level (Lawson, 2011). It adopts a social model approach 
which assists in defining disability and reasonable adjustments, with the aim of removing 
barriers that prevent full participation (EHRC, 2017).  Due to the reactive and individualised 
nature of the duty in the employment sector, employers are not required to make adjustments 
or take reasonable steps to accommodate the requirements of a particular disabled person 
(Lawson, 2008), and in turn fails to address wider societal barriers that exist. It is now 
accepted that the definition of ‘disability’ must be applied in conjunction with EU law.44 
The decision in Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA45 has caused tension in relation to 
both the social and medical models.  Although the EU have officially accepted and adopted a 
social model of disability, the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decision making was based 
on the medical model in Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA46 which undermined the 
Directives goals (Cantor, 2009), and as a consequence contradicted the aim of the Framework 
Directive (Cantor, 2009).  It is common practice that UK Employment Tribunals apply EU 
law in their decision making as it is enshrined in the Equality Directive which establishes the 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation; more importantly it prohibits 
discrimination based on disability and requires reasonable accommodation for disabled 
individuals.47  Although disability is not defined in the Equality Directive, the ECJ has 
revisited this definition recently in a number of rulings.  In Ring v Dansk Almennyttigt 
Boligselskab48 the ECJ referred to the UNCRPD and highlighted that ‘…disability is an 
evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction between persons with 
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others.’49  These social barriers were also 
illustrated in Banaszczyk v Booker Ltd 50 were it was decided that the ‘pick rate’ imposed by 
the Respondent was a potential barrier that prevented full inclusion in working life.51 The 
EAT in this case applied Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA52 and concluded that the 
Claimant had a disability for the purposes of the EqA 2010.  It was noted in the judgement 
that the EAT did not rely upon the 2011 Guidance but instead relied on the legal principles 
set out in the ECJ decision in Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA53 and Ring v Dansk 
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Almennyttigt Boligselskab54.  The concept of ‘professional life’ was not restricted to the case 
‘…of a special skill such as the silversmith or watchmaker limited in some activity that the 
use of their particular tools requires.’55 Instead it was highlighted that the concept should be 
applied to activities that are common across the employment sector.56  The EAT gave a broad 
meaning to work and professional life which related to the manual lifting and moving not the 
‘pick rate’.57  Different working environments in some cases make it difficult to assess 
whether an activity is a ‘normal day to day’ for the purposes of the definition.58  It is clear 
that these rulings have adopted the social model approach by adhering to EU law in defining 
disability, and suggests that the law in some circumstances is beginning to adopt a social 
model approach in defining disability.  However, inconsistencies in some rulings indicate that 
the current law is struggling to transform attitudes due to the restrictive medicalised 
definition of disability. 
Although the ADA 1990 was regarded as ground-breaking the ECJ’s narrow medical model 
interpretation was predictable because of America’s interpretation prior to the renewal of the 
ADA 1990 and the decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court.59 It is apparent, that the judiciary in 
Europe and America specifically have in the past been guided by the social and medical 
model in determining whether an individual is afforded protection, which determines the 
legislative decision making (Cantor, 2009).  In order to overcome these issues or the 
inconsistencies, it is suggested that a potential solution could be to recognise difference in an 
attempt to transform attitudes.  
Recognising and accepting difference – is this the solution to disability 
inequality?
Common assumptions exist about disability that suggest an integrationist or assimilationist 
ethos.  These assumptions focuses on bringing the disabled person back to normality by 
adjusting conditions or creating an environment in an attempt to ensure inclusion. (Imrie, 
1996).  In turn this then assists the disabled person integrating into mainstream society, but 
supplants the idea that people with a disability should not be in mainstream society as they do 
not satisfy the category of ‘normal’ (Imrie, 1996).  In order to eradicate exclusion amongst 
the disabled population, society should accept difference and recognise that individuals have 
vulnerabilities (Herring, 2013), in an attempt to change attitudes, and promote inclusion.  By 
making reasonable adjustments or reasonably accommodating disabled individuals, society 
contributes to oppression by excluding the disabled person which does not assist in changing 
attitudes.  Until society recognises difference and accepts that the definition of ‘normal’ does 
not exist when tackling disability discrimination, social exclusion will still remain.  Although 
this solution is aspirational, a realistic solution would be to challenge ingrained attitudes.  The 
medical model has been criticised for perpetuating the concept of normal, since it takes the 
notion of normality for granted and therefore as fixed (Payne, 2006).  Importantly, it ignores 
the fact that normality is a socially constructed phenomenon. Evidence suggests ‘what is and 
is not normal is socially and culturally relative’ (Payne, 2006: 253).  The duty to make 
reasonable adjustment involves adjusting environmental factors to enable a disabled person to 
participate in society.60  This is also the case in relation to the reasonable accommodation 
contained in the ADA 1990 which focuses on a change in the work environment, or the way 
in which activities are carried out (Wenbourne, 2000).  Reasonable accommodation and the 
reasonable adjustment duty is aimed at integrating the disabled person in society which 
effectively perpetuates disability inequality by not addressing the underlying issues 
associated with inequality. Employers are reluctant to adapt premises and equipment to suit 
the needs of a disabled individual (Payne, 2006), due to ingrained attitudes and perceptions 
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about disability, therefore the disabled individual is perceived as not economically 
productive.  This suggests that the law is not setting society up to recognise difference, and 
challenge the hierarchy (the able-bodied individual and disabled individual).  Even though 
this may be the case, having legislation in place to protect disabled people is a starting point.  
Nevertheless, there are issues with accepting difference.  
On the other hand, if we deny a standard model, as a starting point within human functioning, 
it would be difficult to evaluate impairment and disability.  If there was no normal 
functioning impairment and disability would cease to exist, thus bringing the social model to 
its knees (Terzi, 2004).  This would not only have an impact on disability studies, but also the 
law. Another issue that one may be faced with is the idea of normality and accepting 
difference.  This is even more problematic since it would contradict the aims of eliminating 
discrimination in society (Terzi, 2004).  In order for disabled individuals to integrate and 
function in an oppressive society, ‘disability should be a “positive and central” part of their 
identity’ (Asch, 2001:415).  In a somewhat similar vein, it is important to recognise disability 
as something positive.  Research indicates that the majority of disabled people perceive 
disability as a minority status (Ash, 2001), which raises the issue as to whether it is realistic 
for society to cater for the minority as much as the majority.61  Therefore attention should be 
focussed on considering differing environments which could incorporate the majority of 
individuals whether disabled or not (Asch, 2001) in an attempt to transform ingrained 
attitudes and change perceptions amongst disabled individuals. Research suggests that instead 
of considering the kinds of impairments individuals have, which results in society classifying 
individuals as disabled and others not, it would be beneficial to consider people who cannot 
perform activities in different environments so that they are not disabling (Asch, 2001).  This 
radical proposal suggests that any individual without any change to their environment 
whether it be physical, cognitive, sensory, employment and emotional make-up would be 
considered impaired (Asch, 2001).  A barrier-free environment not only benefits disabled 
individuals, but also others (Oliver, 2009).  The emphasis should focus on accepting that each 
individual has different needs which is unique (Herring, 2013), and perhaps should now be 
incorporated into legislation which may assist in transforming attitudes and breaking barriers 
that limit inclusion.   
Conclusion
Differing theories and models attempt to explain the reasons for inequality.  Although these 
models seem simplistic at first, it must be noted that there are limits to any model which 
restricts understandings of disability. The social model advocates for full inclusion and 
equality within society.  Despite its theoretical limits, it serves as a reminder to society (Terzi, 
2004).  However one must note that models are a way of explaining the issues associated 
with disability discrimination, and the way the world perceives the issues rather than as an aid 
to combatting inequality.  Oliver suggests that the social model should not be considered as a 
social theory, but should rather be seen as an aid to providing a definition of disability from a 
sociological perspective and as a result challenges the medical model (Terzi, 2004).  
It is clear that by changing the law, attitudes will follow.  Where the law changes, people’s 
attitudes will generally change, and society will generally perceive disability as the ‘new 
normal.’    An example being women’s rights, where the law has transformed women’s rights 
(at least to an extent), however this has not been the case with disability.  A contributing 
factor has been the use of the medical model used in legislation to combat disability 
discrimination.  Many supporters of the social model have been critical of this claiming that it 
is the societal barriers that need to be addressed.  Besides making some progress, the law 
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should now focus or reflect a more positive transformative social model, which would 
involve challenging people’s perceptions and attitudes.  As noted above, it has been argued 
that the ADA 1990 as opposed to the EqA 2010 is more compatible with the social model in 
that it attempts to addresses the social issues in society.  It must be noted that we have 
achieved stage one, however we now need to focus on stage two which involves challenging 
perceptions and attitudes which would involve incorporating the social model into British 
legislation.   
Recognising difference may be the solution, although there are fundamental issues with this 
which challenge the social model.  Legislation and case law illustrate that we are constantly 
adjusting to able bodied individuals, this is in line with the individual (medical model), and 
we seem as a society to be measuring a disabled individual against a yardstick, instead of 
perhaps recognising difference. Whilst the law is there to assist in eradicating inequality, it 
leads to inequality by adjusting to what society perceive as ‘normal’.  More importantly, the 
push to export the ADA 1990 across Europe demonstrates that the social model is the model 
that should be followed; if this model is followed inequalities amongst disabled people can be 
addressed.  Unfortunately, the law has failed to combat the underlying issues associated with 
exclusion and attitudes, despite making progress.  In short, the law has not been 
transformative in addressing the issues compared to other forms of discrimination such as 
women’s rights and gay rights; disability discrimination seems to be at odds with this. It is 
not just about accommodating disability, we now need to transform disability by 
incorporating the social model into the definition of disability.  A model based on this may 
assist us in transforming attitudes.  
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1
 Based on 2010 global population.
2
 Although the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates 10% dating from the 1970s. (World Health Organization, 
2011).  The rise in the global estimate is due to the population increasing, rapid spread of chronic diseases such as 
diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and mental illness. (World Health Organization, 2011).   
3
 Section 4 EqA 2010
4
 See also SCA Packaging v Boyle [2009] UKHL 3 and Section 6(1) EqA 2010 for the legal definition of a disability.
5
 The model emerged in the 1970s by activists in the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS).
6
 These include the physical, attitudinal and organisational barriers. 
7 The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines impairment as ‘…any loss or abnormality of psychological, 
physiological or anatomical structure or function.’  Disability on the other has been defined by WHO as ‘…any 
restriction or lack, resulting from an impairment, of ability to perform any activity in the manner or within the range 
considered normal for a human being. (World Health Organisation, 1980).’
8
 For example the employment sector.
9
 Such as memory loss, decision-making difficulties, inability to concentrate, and learning difficulties.
10
 For example, blind people are excellent at piano tuning.
11
 For an individual will be allocated a particular position e.g. defenders, strikers and a goalkeeper.
12
 Other legislation include which attempted to address the problems faced by disabled people included the Education 
Act 1944, National Health Service Act 1946 and the National Assistance Act 1948.
13
 These provisions are similar to the provisions contained in the EQA 2010.
14
 Previous legislation (DDA 1995) listed day to day activities.  This list has now been removed and is not contained in 
the EqA 2010.  Although this is the case the former list and case law serves as guidance in establishing whether an 
activity may be deemed as a day to day activity.
15
 S.6 EqA 2010.
16
 This duty arises where a provision, criteria or practice places a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage (s.20(3) 
& 20(4) EqA 2010.  This has been interpreted in case law – see Smith v Churchill Stairlifts plc [2006] ICR 524 per 
Maurice Kay LJ at para.34; Environment Agency v Rowan [2008] ICR 218 and RBS v Ashton []211] ICR 632.  This 




 [2014] EUECJ 354/13
19
 The strict approach contained in the DDA 1995 required that the mental impairment be clinically well-recognised has 
been removed, therefore case law pre-December 2005 should be interpreted with caution including the suggestion that 
‘anxiety’, ‘stress’ and ‘depression’ may be generic terms to satisfy the requirement of impairment. (Butler, 2014).
20
 Refer to Mc Nicol v Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd [2002] IRLR 711 and Morgan v Staffordshire University 
[2002] IRLR 190.  In Morgan v Staffordshire University [2002] IRLR 190 at 194, para 20, the EAT stated that ‘…there 
is no good ground for expecting tribunal members (or Employment Appeal Tribunal Members) to have anything more 
than a layman’s rudimentary familiarity with psychiatric classification.  Things therefore need to be spelled out.’
21
 In Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust v Norris, the EAT ruled that the medical evidence was not sufficient to 
establish whether the impairment had a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day to day 
activities.  Interestingly in Vicary v British Telecommunications [1999] IRLR 680 the employment tribunal relied on 
the employer’s doctor to decide whether the applicant had an impairment which caused a substantial effect (Woodhams 
and Corby, 2003)
22
 In Vicary v British Telecommunications plc [1999] IRLR 680 activities such as making beds, housework inc, ironing, 
sewing, using scissors, minor DIY, filing nails and curling hair.  In Ekpe v MPC [2001] IRLR 605 (EAT) normal day to 
day activities included putting rollers in and applying make-up.  The case highlighted that it was immaterial that the 
activities were not performed by men (Jefferson, 2014).
23
 In Goodwin v Patent Office [1999] IRLR 4 the claimant had paranoid schizophrenia which affected his behaviour at 
work. This case confirmed the correct approach outlined in the EqA 2010.
24
 Define in s.212(1) EqA 2010 as ‘more than minor or trivial’.
25
 This was the approach taken in Leonard v Southern Derbyshire Chamber of Commerce [2001] IRLR 19 (EAT).  In 
Paterson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] UKEAT/0635/06/2307.  it was held that the effect 
dyslexia had in a high-pressure exam amounted a substantial adverse on his normal day to day activities, and therefore 
satisfied the definition of ‘disability’.
26
 Coleman v Attridge Law Case C-303/06 [2008] IRLR 722.
27
 S.212 EqA 2010 defines substantial as ‘more than minor or trivial’ See Goodwin v The Patent Office [1999] IRLR 4 
EAT, where it was held that the tribunal had been misdirected.
28
 The impairment must have lasted 12 months - see Patel v Oldham MBC [2010] IRLR 280.  
29
 SCA Packaging Ltd v Boyle [2009] UKHL 3, was a landmark decision in which the House of Lords clarified the 
correct approach in relation to defining disability.  
20
30
 For example ramps that benefit non-disabled people such as parents with young children who use prams.  
31
 Schedule 1, paragraph 6 and paragraph 3 EQA 2010.
32
 The law was previously contained in the DDA 2005, now it is contained in the EQA 2010.
33
 S20-22 EqA 2010 sets out the reasonable adjustment duty.
34
 [2015] UKEAT 0010/15
35
 Monmouthsire County Council v Harris [2015] UKEAT 0010/15 para 59
36
 S.6(1) EqA 2010
37
 For example, employment, goods, facility, services, transport, and education.
38 [2004] IRLR 651
39
 In Archibald v Fife [2004] IRLR 651 the claimant was treated more favourably this is not a consideration the court 
will take into account (in this case the employer) in order absolve the duty if it is required in order to remove the 
substantial disadvantage (Lawson, 2008).
40
 In Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc v Allen [2009] EWCA Civ 1213 CA.  The bank had failed to provide 
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